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WATER TRANSFERS AND EXCHANGES: USING THE MARKET
TO IMPROVE WATER USE--A LEGAL/INSTITUTIONAL VIEW
I.	 Introduction: Putting the Market in its Place--One
Relocation Mechanism Among Many
A. The Rellocation Phenomenon: Something Old, Something
New
Water was allocated initially in the West as a free




earliest days of settlement through the transfer of
appropriative water rights, normally in connection with
the conveyance of the land to which the water right was
attached. Many western towns and cities so established
or expanded their water supplies, and that legacy goes
on.
B. Rellocative Mechanisms: Some Illustrative Cases
There are numerous ways to reallocate the rights to use
water, some of which are market oriented, others of
which are more aligned with regulatory intervention.
1. Voluntary Transfers of Water Right Interests for
Compensation
The various kinds of water rights -- fee title,
shares, contract rights -- are normally
transferable in whole or part, subject to
occasional constraints, such as public agency
review and third party rights.
a. Sales
The transfer of the total fee property
interest of a water right normally occurs in
conjunction with a land conveyance, but a
severance is allowable in most western
states.
b. Leases for Set Term
The leasing of water rights for a season,
year or many years is usually possible and
provides an attractive alternative to a sale,
particularly where a risky venture or
fixed-life use is involved.
c. Dry Year or Emergency Option to Lease
An option to lease senior rights under
drought or other emergency conditions can
offer flexibility and security to municipal
and industrial water users. The pooling of
such options holds promise as a means of
helping to drought-proof communities.
Example: Utah city and farmers.
d.	 Foregoing Priority for Shortage-Sharing
Holders of senior rights may be able to
effectively market their seniority by
agreeing to share shortages during dry
years. Example: San Juan-Chama diversion.
2.	 Conservation Offsets to Create Usable Surplus
If a municipal or industrial user buys or already
holds a junior water right and wants greater
assurance of supply under scarcer conditions, it
may be able to achieve that end by making water
conservation investments in a senior use, creating
surplus available for the junior use. Example:
Proposed contract between Metropolitan Water
District and Imperial Irrigation District.
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3. Exchanges
An agreement to exchange one water supply for
another temporarily, seasonally or permanently
can leave all parties better off. Through
multiple exchanges it may be possible in some
settings to serve remotely located new users.
Example: Utah plans regarding Bear River.
4. Contractual and Regulatory Drought Priorities
Water delivery contracts in large projects can
specify reallocative priorities which take effect
during droughts. Municipal uses and orchards, for
example, can be preferred over annual crops.
Example: California Water Project contracts and
the 1976-77 drought.
5. Involuntary Transfers of Water Right Interests
a. Abandonment and Forfeiture
All or part of a water right can be lost to a
holder who abandons or forfeits under state
law, with the benefit inuring to junior right
holders, new appropriators or the public.
b.	 Eminent Domain
Where authorized, public agencies and
utilities can condemn existing water rights,
transferring their title and use. This
reallocation mechanism is constrained by
politics and limited funds.
C. The Changing Context of Choice
The conditions which influence the availability and
choice of a reallocative mechanism are changing
markedly in many areas. Declining agricultural
commodity prices, for example, have put some farmers
behind legislative and regulatory reforms making it
easier to transfer water rights.
II. Legal-Institutional Factors Influencing the Reallocative
Choice
A.	 Transferability of the Right
The water right needs to be of a kind legally regarded
as transferable. Most are so regarded, but some, such
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as riparian rights in California, are not.
B. Salvage Rights
More water can become available for reallocation when
right holders are allowed to transfer rights to water
which they conserve. This permits a user to yield up
water for money without relocation or dislocation.
Califonrnia Water Code 1011.
C. Acquisition, Transaction and Treatment Costs
Asking prices for water rights vary markedly and can
fluctuate. Additional expenses, such as those
associated with obtaining public agency approval of the
change in use and point of diversion, or with the
upgrading of the quality of the water to meet the new
intended use, bear on the decision of the would-be
buyer or lessee.
D. Origin and Destination Conditions
In large-scale transfers, the precondition of first
conserving existing supplies or of meeting
area-of-origin requirements can face the water
purchaser. Example: California legislative
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provisions, existing and proposed (Proposition 13;
1982).
E. Access to Plumbing and Facilities
Reallocation involves transporting water in a natural
or man-made distribution system. The feasibility of a
transaction can turn on whether access can be gained to
existing water works controlled by a third party.
Example: Proposed carriage of Yampa River water to San
Diego via the Colorado River Aqueduct; pending Katz
bill in California, Assembly Bill 2746.
F. Risk: Legal, Economic, Social and Political
Uncertainty
Uncertainties and risks underlie many water
reallocations. For example, the quantum or value of
the right may later be determined to be less then
represented, the terms of an agreement may be socially
or politically dishonored over time, a thrid party
may become injured and sue, or an unforeseen regulatory
restraint may arise.
III. Water Markets: Definitions, Examples, Opportunities and
Needed Reforms
Enthusiasm over the belated judicial recognition of water as
a commodity may be leading to some inflated expectations as
to the extent and rate of private water marketing in the
West. Standards for comparison and analysis are needed.
A. Definitional Issues
What definition of "market" is appropriate for
describing what is happening or is expected to happen
in the transfer of water rights in the West? How much
access, information, price equilibration, volume or
privatization is necessary for a "water market" to
exist?
B. Examples: Real and Potential
To highlight the definitional problems, several
examples of contemporary transfers or proposed
transfers, reflecting different features, can be cited.
1.	 Colorado Front Range
Water right "units" covering Colorado Big Thompson
project water in the Northern Colorado Conservancy
District are marketed through centralized listings
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of bids and offers. Specialized brokers operate
in the area. Appropriative rights are being sold
in many instances through noncompetitive
bargaining.
2. New Mexico
Controversy surrounding the transfer of water
rights from within to without the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, which encompasses
Alburquerque, illustrates the role water districts
can play in transfers: Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District v. Cox.
3. Utah
The Intermountain Power Project near Lynndyl,
Utah, involved the acquisition of shares in local
mutual water companies at a price of $1,775/acre
foot, with the sellers being responsible for
obtaining approval or the change of use and
arranging protection for third-party rights.
4. Arizona
The City of Scottsdale in 1984 purchased a large
ranch and several farms totaling about 184,000
acres for their water rights, paying $11.6
million. The City of Tucson reportedly has
purchased more than 20,000 acres of farm land over
recent years, specifically for the water rights.
Transfers of "grandfathered" grand water rights
are occuring in the active management areas
established under the 1980 Groundwater Act. The
water contracts for The Central Arizona Project,
however, prohibit transfers for profit.
5. California
Short-term transfers occurred during the 1976-77
drought, reform legislation has encouraged
transfers, and there is an increasing willingness
among some financially-pressed farmers to sell,
but this has not yet led to significant increases
in water marketing. Transfer from San Joaquin
Valley to Los Angeles and San Diego areas appear
more promising than transfer from the Sacramento
Valley across the Delta to the south.
6. Indian Nations
The permanent transfer of reserved rights is not
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authorized. On-reservation leasing of water in
connection with farm land leasing, however, does
occur and leasing for off-reservation use may
become a reality selectively (e.g., Arizona and
Montana).
7.	 Interstate
Notwithstanding Sporhase, some interstate
transfers (e.g., in basins covered by federally
approved compacts which allocate surplus and
define state entitlements in terms of consumptive
use) face legal constraints.
C. Selective Legal Reforms Needed to Accommodate and
Encourage the Rise and Effectiveness of Water Markets
1. Right to Market Conserved Water
There has been a legal bias against the transfer
of conserved water in the West, but there are
selective signs of change. Changes in attitudes
toward both appurtenancy and the protection of
holders of rights in return flows can be expected
over time. Change in California law and policy
during the 1980's may be illustrative (California
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Water Code, 109, 382-87, 1011, 1244, 1735-39).
2. Right to Store and Transfer or Exchange Recharge
Waters
Legislation allowing one to retain rights to water
used for recharging aquifers can encourage
conjunctive management and creative exchange
arrangements.
3. Right of Access to Public Storage and Carriage
Capacity
Where water works are monopolized but under-used,
procedures for allowing access to facilitate
transfers and exchanges, while safeguarding
existing users, ought to be considered.
4. Redefinition and Enforcement of Beneficial Use,
Reasonable Use, Abandonment and Forfeiture
Provisions
Traditional water law contains workable doctrines
for combating waste, which, if defined more
clearly in contemporary terms and enforced more
vigorously, could increase the amount of water
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available for transfer.
5. Removal of Consumptive Use Requirement for State
Entitlements
If state entitlements in interstate waters were
not dependent on in-state consumptive use,
interstate transfers would be encouraged because
states could obtain economic rents without
developing the water or while waiting to develop
the water. Statutory or interstate compact
provisions would be required in the Colorado River
Basin.
6. Allowance of Profit in Sale or Lease of Water
Rights in Federal Reclamation Projects
Resistance to the profitable transfers of
appropriative or contract rights exercised in
Federal Reclamation projects persists because of
concern over private windfalls made possible by
public subsidy, although support for greater
marketability has been rising.
7. Removal of Geographical Limits in Water Delivery
Contracts
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Protectionist areal boundaries are imposed upon
the right to transfer in some water delivery
contracts. such restraints may be modified or
removed through renegotiation.
8. Redefinition of Anti-Speculation Provisions
In some settings the public interest may be served
by the passive holding -- pooling -- of water
rights to meet contingencies ranging from low or
contaminated drinking water supplies to low
fishery flows, perhaps demanding a redefinition of
the anti-speculation provisions of some western
laws.
9. Other Possibilities
Other legal incentives encouraging transfers,
addressed particularly to water districts and
agencies, ought to be considered.
IV. The Challenge: Reallocating Water to Serve a Desirable Mix
of Efficiency, Equity and Environmental Quality Values
A. The Multiple-Value Context of Western Water Management
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and the Myth of Single-Value Solutions -- Market or
Otherwise
Reallocation must variously serve the efficiency,
equity and environmental quality values held by the
public. Some of the current reallocation involves
correcting historic neglect of efficiency and
environmental quality, and the equitable claims of
Indians.
B. Modes of Conflict and Consensus
Water marketing may marginally facilitate consensus
building and the management of conflict, but public
modes of decision making will continue to dominate
water reallocation and management for the foreseeable
future.
C. Adaption of Laws and Institutions to Changing
Conditions and Values
The transition from development to management,
including reallocation, is dynamic, testing the
capacity of water institutions and water laws to adapt
to forces which are largely outside their effective
control.
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